

ID # 209853 CU

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6-27

# WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

- O - OUTGOING
- H - INTERNAL
- I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 1/1

Name of Correspondent: ice Graham

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: FOIA request

### ROUTE TO:

### ACTION

### DISPOSITION

Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
	<u>Cue/c</u>	ORIGINATOR	<u>9/10/21</u>			
	<u>Crat 23</u>	Referral Note:	<u>A 9/10/21</u>	<u>no</u>		<u>9/10/21</u>
		Referral Note:				
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#### ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure
- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

#### DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

#### FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.  
 Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).  
 Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.  
 Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 19, 1991

Dear Mr. Graham:

I am writing in response to your letter of December 27, 1990, in which you request, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, documents pertaining to military spending on high-technology aircraft. I apologize for the delay in our response.

Please be advised that the White House Office, as an entity whose "sole function is to advise and assist the President," is not an agency subject to the Freedom of Information Act. Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980). Accordingly, we must respectfully decline to comply with your request.

If you believe that the documents you are seeking may be in the possession of another entity within the Executive branch that is subject to FOIA, you may wish to make your request directly to that office.

Very truly yours,



Mark R. A. Paoletta  
Assistant Counsel to the President

Mr. Lee M. Graham  
526 W. Maple  
Monrovia, CA 91016

209853ca

27 December 1990

OPEN LETTER

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

Freedom of Information Act Request  
(5 U.S.C. 552)  
Mandatory Review Request  
Executive Order 12356

GEORGE BUSH  
President of the United States  
of America  
1600 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Sir, permit me to quote from an article (see enclosure A, page 41 and 44) titled-

"Scientists' and Engineers' Dreams  
Taking to Skies as 'Black' Aircraft"-

-by "William B. Scott" found in the "December 24, 1990" issue of "AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY".

"It is certain, however, that eight years of the Reagan Administration were good to the black world. For whatever reason, billions were pumped into highly classified, special access programs and new facilities, allowing creative scientists and bright engineers unprecedented opportunities to experiment and test their wildest dreams. Their only constraint, apparently, was that projects be linked to operational considerations and pragmatic applications."

"A number of those dreams have taken wing in the past few years, and increasing numbers of new, exotic vehicles have been reported by ground observers throughout the U.S. recently (AW&ST Dec. 18, 1989, p. 42; Oct. 1, p. 22). In addition airline and military pilots have reported seeing unusual high-altitude, maneuvering vehicles the last few years."

"What these sightings add up to is this: The U.S. has developed a fleet of new aircraft and is either testing them or already flying several types in operational service. Because they are considered 'super-super-black' programs, military and other government officials deny their

existence."

And-

"Finally, as Persian Gulf tensions continue into 1991, one must question whether the U.S. commander in chief and his defense secretary are fully aware of super-black weapon systems' potential."

"Lets hope so."

"Hard as it may be to fathom, there is reason to wonder whether complete knowledge of the most exotic aircraft may reach 'The Top,' all for super-security."

"One would like to think America's staggering black-world expenditures have yielded weaponry that could neutralize Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's most valued military and political assets quickly. Some say that capability is in hand and could be used-albeit with conventional payloads-if the right people choose to do so. If they do not, why not?"

"If so, why are almost 400,000 U.S. and allied troops dug into the sand in Saudi Arabia, prepared to slug it out in a bloody ground war?"

"Maybe it's time for America's taxpayers to demand an accounting of their black-world investments."

"The tradeoffs between national security-the reason for keeping programs 'black' in the first place-and the lives of those troops are worthy of wider consideration."

I, wholeheartedly agree and respectfully request-

1. An accounting by you, the President of the United States, of what our billions in tax dollars has yielded us in these "black programs".
2. An acknowledgement or refutation that any of this money has been spent in the flight testing of a recovered Alien aircraft.

Thank you for your time Sir.

A copy of this letter is being sent to WILLIAM B. SCOTT of AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY for reference.

Sincerely,



Lee M. Graham  
526 W. Maple  
Monrovia, CA  
91016

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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
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# Scientists' and Engineers' Dreams Taking to Skies as 'Black' Aircraft

WILLIAM B. SCOTT/LOS ANGELES



Unmanned diamond-shaped hypersonic vehicle has control surfaces on leading and trailing edges, and 121 ports for dispensing nuclear warheads (insert, lower left). Conventional powerplants boost the aircraft to supersonic speeds, where an external burning mechanism takes over.

Super-classified "black" aircraft development programs have served the U.S. and its allies well during the last 40-plus years, providing specialized vehicles such as the U-2/TR-1, SR-71 and F-117A. Still unproven, but also products of this special access shadow world, are the B-2 bomber and Navy A-12, among others.

How many additional air vehicles may have been developed, yet never revealed publicly, often is debated but rarely proven.

It is certain, however, that eight years of the Reagan Administration were good to the black world. For whatever reason,

billions of dollars were pumped into highly classified, special access programs and new facilities, allowing creative scientists and bright engineers unprecedented opportunities to experiment and test their wildest dreams. Their only constraint, apparently, was that projects be linked to operational considerations and pragmatic applications.

A number of those dreams have taken wing in the past few years, and increasing numbers of new, exotic vehicles have been reported by ground observers throughout the U.S. recently (AW&S Dec. 18, 1989, p. 42; Oct. 1, p. 22). In addition, airline pilots have reported seeing

unusual high-speed, high-altitude, maneuvering vehicles during the last few years.

What these sightings add up to is this: The U.S. has developed a fleet of new aircraft and is either testing them or already flying several types in operational service. Because they are considered "super-super-black" programs, military and other government officials deny their existence.

Those who are briefed and know such aircraft exist cannot admit it, and those who are not briefed simply do not know. The best guesses of experts—and those who think they should know, by virtue of their position—really are no more reveal-

ing than those of a technically minded layman extrapolating from the known state of "white world" technology.

But for all those billions, what has the American taxpayer bought? Is the nation—and the world—any safer? Do we now possess the "ultimate" weapons featured in comic books—the ones so devastating any potential adversary would never think of disturbing the peace for fear of the good guys' retaliation? Are exotic black-world aircraft real peace-makers?

Maybe.

Briefings and well-choreographed show-and-tell sessions given to selected members of Congress and key government officials in the late 1980s would lead one to believe some of these exotic aircraft just might be such weapons. While unabashedly appealing for continued funding under the Bush Administration, proud hosts of these sessions referred to unique air vehicles on display as "the reasons the Iron Curtain fell."

#### LOOKS AND MISSIONS

Unfortunately, proving the existence of such aircraft is not a trivial task for those well-grounded on the unclassified side of the fence, despite bits and pieces of strong evidence in hand. So, most of the curious among us are reduced to watching the night sky, sifting through tons of technical literature and making educated deductions. Through this process, a natural first question any technical skeptic worth his salt might ask is: "What would such a vehicle look like, and what would be its mission?"

For sake of argument, let's consider the following details as comprising a theoretical possibility of a hypersonic U.S.-developed aircraft which could be cruising the skies tonight:

- An elongated, diamond-shaped unmanned vehicle measuring about 110 ft. long and 60 ft. wide at its midpoint. Call it a flattened football shape. But fore and aft end points, as well as the leading edges, are rounded rather than sharp. Although diamond-shaped, the aircraft's basic contours might be described as similar to those of a smooth "skipping stone." The vehicle has a heavy appearance, likened to the blocky sturdiness of a Caterpillar tractor or even the space shuttle.

- All surfaces are covered with black ceramic tiles, quite similar to those now used on the shuttle orbiter. They have a scorched, heat-streaked appearance, and seem to be coated with a crystalline patina indicative of sustained exposure to high temperature. A burnt-carbon odor emanates from the surface. The aft body tiles are distinctly more pockmarked and degraded than those on the forward half of the aircraft, as if they had experienced the most heat.

- Jet engines buried in the lower fuselage are fed by inlet ducts that open into the tile surface. These powerplants boost the aircraft to supersonic speeds, at which an external burning mechanism takes over as the primary propulsion method. The turbojets are shut down, and their inlet/exhaust ports are closed until speed drops to the low Mach numbers again.

In the high-Mach regime, misted fuel is ejected from the fuselage midsection—the "break point" of the elongated diamond—across the aft surface tiles, into the area between the fuselage and a shock wave attached to this break. In essence, the sloping, converging aft fuselage sections form the inside of a "nozzle," and the shock boundary constitutes the outer surface, creating an expanding exhaust effect, much like that on a conventional rocket.

The fuel is ignited by surface heating—or other means—creating combustion

*Eight years of the Reagan Administration in Washington were very good to the black world*

that accelerates the aircraft up to the Mach 6-8 regime.

- Narrow leading and trailing edge sections provide aerodynamic control in all axes.

- On the fuselage underside, forward of the midsection and between the buried powerplants, is a clipped-diamond section covered with 121 tile-covered ports. Behind each cover—which is flush with the fuselage surface—rests a nuclear warhead which approximates the shape of either a reentry vehicle (RV) or an artillery shell. Each RV stands vertically, point down.

When released, the cover tile is discarded, the weapon is ejected downward, and a second tile automatically is moved into position, closing the port and retaining a smooth aircraft surface. These weapons are dispensed only at subsonic speeds to enhance accuracy and avoid internal heating problems from opening a port in the lower, heated external surfaces, especially when in the hypersonic regime.

*William B. Scott is senior engineering editor in AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY's Los Angeles bureau. As a flight test engineer graduate of the U.S. Air Force Test Pilot School and a civil commercial pilot, he has logged more than 2,000 hr. on about 45 aircraft types. He spent nine years in the Air Force and was a flight test engineer and program manager in the aerospace industry.*

- The unmanned vehicle is capable of onboard self-control, but also will accept external commands via satellite or a ground station. Sandia's Winged Energetic Reentry Vehicle Experiment (SWERVE) project confirmed that electromagnetic signals can be received by such a vehicle, even through the ionized layer surrounding it at hypersonic speeds (AW&ST Aug. 6, p. 25).

Clearly, an unmanned vehicle of this type would be a powerful strategic weapon, able to devastate targets over a wide area. Its Mach 6-8 speed would improve the ability to survive greatly, because fighters and ground-to-air missiles would be hard-pressed to intercept the vehicle. Even though it must slow to possibly subsonic speeds for weapons delivery, the aircraft's surface structure and low radar cross-section contours would give it respectable low observable characteristics which could complicate targeting by defenders.

#### DREAM COME TRUE

Reconnaissance versions would have twice the speed capability of the now-retired SR-71, yet, being unmanned, would not risk the loss of a human crew when operating over high-threat areas. Once proven effective, such an aircraft would be a dream come true for any four-star in charge of the Strategic Air Command.

Of course, it also would complicate the Air Force's arguments for funding expensive armaments such as the B-2 bomber, MX missile and small ICBM. Could these still be justified, in the numbers originally requested?

Finally, as Persian Gulf tensions continue into 1991, one must question whether the U.S. commander in chief and his defense secretary are fully aware of super-black weapon systems' potential.

Let's hope so.

Hard as it may be to fathom, there is reason to wonder whether complete knowledge of the most exotic aircraft may reach "The Top," all for super-security.

One would like to think America's staggering black-world expenditures have yielded weaponry that could neutralize Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's most valued military and political assets quickly. Some say that capability is in hand and could be used—albeit with conventional payloads—if the right people choose to do so. If they do not, why not?

If so, why are almost 400,000 U.S. and allied troops dug into the sand in Saudi Arabia, prepared to slug it out in a bloody ground war?

Maybe it's time for America's taxpayers to demand an accounting of their black-world investments.

The tradeoffs between national security—the reason for keeping programs "black" in the first place—and the lives of those troops are worthy of wider consideration. □

CS

ID # 21753 CU

# WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

FE010-01

O - OUTGOING

H - INTERNAL

I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD)   /  /  

Name of Correspondent: LEE M. GRAHAM

MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: Freedom of Information Act request; RE: his correspondence to the Department of the Air Force for information on defense-related programs; wants the President's assistance

### ROUTE TO:

### ACTION

### DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
CUOFC	ORIGINATOR	92 10 115			92 12 116
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CS

CS

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29915304

5 January 1992

OFFICE OF THE  
DIRECTOR

JAN 15 1992

OPEN LETTER

Freedom of Information Act Request  
(5 U.S.C. 552)

C.B. (1/14)

Mr. GEORGE BUSH  
President of the United States of America  
1600 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Attn: RICHARD L. WEAVER  
Colonel, USAF  
Deputy for Security and  
Investigative Programs  
Secretary of the Air Force  
THRU: SAF/AAIS  
Washington, DC 20330-1000

Dear Mr. President:

Sir, I am writing to you because of this article (see enclosure A) titled-

"Bush Suggests Putting Defense  
Cuts in 'Pockets of Taxpayers'"

by "DOUGLAS JEHL" which appeared on page "A13" of the  
"SATURDAY, JANUARY 4, 1992" issue of the "LOS ANGELES  
TIMES".

I am also writing because of another associated article (see enclosure B-1) titled-

"Testing the B-2  
Stealth Bomber"

which appeared in the Editorial pages of the Los Angeles  
Times" dated "SATURDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1991".

In this article (see enclosure B-1) a-

"MAJ. GEN. STEPHEN B. CORKER  
Assistant Secretary for Acquisition  
Department of the Air Force  
Washington, D.C"-

appears to be writing to the Los Angeles Times in defense of  
the purchase of the B-2 despite the high cost to the  
American taxpayer.

Maj. Gen. CROKER (in part) states-

"By claiming the Air Force is hiding behind a cloak of 'excessive secrecy,' he" (speaking of some critic to the B-2 Program) "suggests the Air Force is suppressing information. In fact, within the last two years, security guidelines governing control of B-2 information have been relaxed."

While I used to be a strong advocate for the production of the B-2, in this instance, I took the position of the critic and wrote this (see enclosure B-2, dated "7 December 1991") Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the USAF regarding a number of "Black" aircraft programs that appear in the budget, but for which no amount of purchase price is provided.

I enclose (see enclosure C, pages 379-382; from the "December 6, 1991" issue of "Defense Daily") for your perusal.

This article (see enclosure C) lists as an example-

"Line	PE	Program
44	63105F	OLYMPIC
46	6311F	MERIDIAN
132	27137F	CONSTANT HELP
138	27169F	SEEK CLOCK
148	27424F	COPPER COAST
153	27582F	HAVE TRUMP (H)
155	27591F	OMEGA
159	28042F	HAVE FLAG
162	35142F	CENTENNIAL
165	41316F	SENIOR CITIZEN
175	31317F	SENIOR YEAR OPERATIONS
176	31324F	FOREST GREEN"

Since the United States Air Force has itself declared that the the code name SENIOR YEAR stands for the USAF/CIA Lockheed U-2 aircraft, it is not unreasonable to assume that any and/or all of the above indicated code names apply to "Black" aircraft Programs.

Indeed, in an article (see enclosure D, pages 41 & 44; from the "December 24, 1990" issue of "AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY") titled-

"Scientists' and Engineers' Dreams  
Taking to Skies as 'Black' Aircraft"-

writer "William B. Scott" (in part) states-

"But for all those billions, what has the American taxpayer bought? Is the nation-and the world-any safer? Do we now

possess the 'ultimate' weapons featured in comic books-the ones so devastating any potential adversary would never think of disturbing the peace for fear of the good guys' retaliation? Are exotic black-world aircraft real peace makers?"

"Maybe."

"Briefings and well-choreographed show-and-tell sessions given to selected members of Congress and key government officials in the late 1980s would lead one to believe some of these exotic aircraft just might be such weapons. While unabashedly appealing for continued funding under the Bush Administration, proud hosts of these sessions referred to unique air vehicles on display as 'the reasons the Iron Curtain fell.'"

President Bush, Sir, of the credibility of AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY you have (in part) stated-

"I am sure that the fine journalistic tradition that has been carried on by this magazine's publishers and staff will endure for many years to come. Best wishes for continuing success. (from the "August 12, 1991" issue of "AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY").

In response to my FOIA (see enclosure B-2) regarding the existence of these "black" aircraft, their cost, and relationship to the B-2 Program I received this reply (see enclosure B-3, dated "24 DEC 1991") which states-

"Dear Mr. Graham:

We are responding to your December 7, 1991 letter citing the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

Your letter does not request records under the FOIA; therefore, we are taking no further action.

Sincerely,

CAROLYN W. PRICE  
Freedom of Information Manager".

Mr. President, Sir, according to you, we are no longer in a cold war with the Soviet Union and there is, thus, no threat to our National Security; the very reason why you are suggesting putting Defense cuts in the "Pockets of (the) Taxpayers".

The Executive Order 12356, Section 1.6 Limitations on Classification (see enclosure F, page 655) states-

"(a) In no case shall information be classified in order to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; to prevent embarrassment to a person, organization,

or agency; to restrain competition; or to prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of national security."

Since the USAF refuses to respond to the FOIA regarding my request for information about the above indicated Programs supported by the American taxpayer-

I respectfully request that you direct my letter (see enclosure B-2) to that Agency of the United States Government that will have the courtesy to respond.

Thank you for your time Sir.

Sincerely,



Lee M. Graham  
526 W. Maple  
Monrovia, CA  
91016

A copy of this letter is being referenced to the following-

Senator ALAN CRANSTON  
The Editor, The Los Angeles Times  
Mr. WILLIAM SCOTT, AvWeek



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON DC 20330-1000

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

24 DEC 1991


Mr. Lee M. Graham  
526 W. Maple  
Monrovia, CA 91016

Dear Mr. Graham:

We are responding to your December 7, 1991 letter citing the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

Your letter does not request records under the FOIA; therefore, we are taking no further action.

Sincerely,

  
CAROLYN W. PRICE  
Freedom of Information Manager

91-1485


**EDITORIALS of THE TIMES**

## Letters to The Times

### Testing the B-2 Stealth Bomber

■ In response to "Why Test the Weapons? Pentagon Just Grades Itself," by Scott Shuger, Opinion, Oct. 6:

Shuger's column alleges that the B-2 has not been adequately tested and that the monitoring and reporting of actual test results by independent Department of Defense organizations have been "biased" by organizations not truly independent. The B-2 is in fact the most thoroughly tested aircraft in history, and Shuger's allegations regarding the objectivity of the Defense Science Board (DSB) and DoD's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) are totally unwarranted.

Contrary to Shuger's claim, when the Air Force announced a shortfall in one portion of one low observability test conducted on July 16, there was no concern expressed regarding the B-2's structural soundness. All structural testing to date has been successful, and the results have exceeded expectations.

By claiming the Air Force is hiding behind a cloak of "excessive secrecy," he suggests the Air Force is suppressing information. In fact, within the last two years, security guidelines governing control of B-2 information have been relaxed. Information regarding low observable characteristics of the B-2 remains classified to preserve the unprecedented advantage the U.S. enjoys in this area of technology, and to protect pilots' lives.

Shuger's attempt to discredit the objectivity and credibility of the DSB and DoD OT&E as independent organizations with claims about financial links between specific individuals and contractors is inappropriate. His insinuations that these individuals have somehow "colored" B-2 test results are unsubstantiated and untrue.

The former director of OT&E, John Krings, was instrumental in development of the System Maturity Matrix (SMM) idea to provide a "yardstick" for DoD and Congress to measure development/flight test progress. Although he was director during the early stages of B-2 development, he left that position in July, 1989, shortly before B-2 flight tests started—obviously before any flight test results had been generated.

Regarding the Defense Science Board, there is no record of Jim Roche ever serving as a member of the DSB, although he did support two DSB task forces totally unrelated to B-2. Don Hicks, Sol Love and retired Maj. Gen. Jasper Welch also never served on the B-2 Task Force.

**MAJ. GEN. STEPHEN B. CROKER**  
Assistant Secretary for Acquisition  
Department of the Air Force  
Washington, D.C.

### Los Angeles Times

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Executive Vice President*

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Letters to the Editor, Los Angeles Times  
Times Mirror Square, Los Angeles, CA 90053

15 - 4  
7 December 1991

OPEN LETTER

Freedom of Information Act Request  
(5 U.S.C. 552)

MAJ. GEN. STEPHEN B. CROKER  
Assistant Secretary for Acquisition  
Department of the Air Force  
Washington, D.C. 20330-1000

Letters to the Editor  
Los Angeles Times  
Times Mirror Square  
Los Angeles, CA 90053

Dear Maj. Gen. Croker:

Sir, I am making this FOIA request to you as a response to the article (see enclosure A) that appeared on page B-5 of this morning's Los Angeles Times dated "SATURDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1991".

The article is titled-

"Testing The B-2  
Stealth Bomber"-

and appears to be a kind of public appeal on your part for honesty when discussing the testing of the B-2.

It is to honesty and the testing of USAF "black" world aircraft of which the B-2 once belonged, that I direct this letter.

My requests are as follows-

1. To what specific aircraft do the following codenames refer; how much has the American taxpayer spent on these aircraft; where were they flight tested; and how have they contributed to the design of the B-2?

AURORA  
COPPER COAST  
OLYMPIC  
OMEGA  
SENIOR CITIZEN  
SENIOR TREND  
SNOWBIRD  
THEME CASTLE


2. On what dates where Senators SAM NUNN and ALAN CRANSTON apprized of the existence of the above indicated aircraft Projects?

3. Who is the current Commander of the USAF flight test facility at Groom Lake, Nevada?

4. What is the codename for the aircraft that has recently been sonic bombing residents of Southern California, that AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY Magazine calls the "pulser"?

Thank you for your time Sir.

Sincerely,



Lee M. Graham  
526 W. Maple  
Monrovia, CA  
91016

A copy of this letter is being referenced to the following-

- Senator SAM NUNN
- Senator ALAN CRANSTON
- Mr. WILLIAM SCOTT AvWeek
- Mr. JOHN MORROCCO AvWeek

## Bush Suggests Putting Defense Cuts in 'Pockets of Taxpayers'

By DOUGLAS JEHL  
TIMES STAFF WRITER

SINGAPORE—President Bush said today he was considering a plan to make further cuts in the nation's defense budget in order to put the savings "into the pockets of the American taxpayers."

Such a move would mark a major shift in policy for the White House because it would force a renegotiation of the 1990 budget agreement, which requires that any savings be used to cut the budget deficit.

But as he comes under increasing political pressure to come up with a package to rekindle economic growth, Bush suggested for the first time that any peace dividend ought to be used "to stimulate the economy."

The unexpected signal of a willingness to revise the budget pact is likely to set off a bidding war with Congress, where Democrats have already urged that defense savings be used to help fund a range of new domestic programs.

But Bush, while insisting that he had not yet made a final decision, made clear that he would resist any effort to use the defense cuts to increase domestic spending.

"I will simply reiterate my determination not to do anything that is going to reverse the economy and make it worse," Bush said at a joint news conference with Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tang.

As his advisers put the finishing touches on an economic growth package, however, he left little

doubt that he regarded as increasingly attractive a tax cut funded by defense cuts.

Asked whether he was ready to change the budget agreement to permit him to use savings from defense for other purposes, Bush replied: "Frankly, I'd like to put it into the pockets of the American taxpayer, if I possibly could, because I think that's what's needed."

A senior Administration official traveling with Bush said it was now "likely" that savings in defense would be used to pay for the middle-class tax cut the White House has said it is considering.

Bush is expected to unveil his economic plan in his State of the Union address on Jan. 28.

It remains unclear how much money could be freed up by such reductions in defense spending. But there have been unconfirmed reports in Washington that the Pentagon has been asked to outline \$50 billion in additional defense cuts over the next five years.

Meanwhile, Senate Democrats in Washington on Friday unveiled a wide economic plan that would combine a middle-class tax cut with a longer-term "Marshall Plan for America" that would redirect defense spending to domestic needs such as bridges, roads.

The plan also calls, in the short term, for additional unemployment insurance benefits as well as grants and loans to state and local governments designed to create jobs in education, transportation and public safety.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT: AIR FORCE R&D

We continue our presentation of the National Defense Authorization Act of FY '92-93 passed by Congress last month. Air Force RDT&E allocations appear below. Dollars are in thousands.

Line	PE	Program	Amended FY'92 Request	House Authorized	Senate Authorized	Conference Chg to Request	Conference Authorized
41	63728F	ADVANCED COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY	9,857	9,857	9,857		9,857
42	63789F	C3 ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT	9,635	9,635	9,635		9,635
43	10011F	ADVANCED SPECIAL OPS RESRCH, DEV AND ACQ					
44	63105F	OLYMPIC	[ ]				[ ]
45	63110F	SPECIAL EVALUATION PROGRAM	[ ]				[ ]
46	6311F	MERIDIAN	[ ]				[ ]
47	63311F	ADVANCED STRATEGIC MISSILE SYSTEMS					
48	63367F	RELOCATABLE TARGET CAPABILITY PROGRAM					
49	64226F	B-1B	3,574	3,574	3,574	-200	3,374
50	6424F	B-2 ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY BOMBER	1,563,072	1,563,072	1,563,072	-200	1,562,872
51	64240F	SRAM II	165,879	165,879	165,879	-151,879	14,000
52	64312F	ICBM MODERNIZATION					
	64312F	(START COMPLIANCE)	4,083	4,083	4,083	10,600	14,683
	64312F	(PEACEKEEPER IN SILOS)	2,906	2,906	2,906		2,906
	64312F	(RAIL GARRISON)	260,082	260,082	245,082	-260,082	
	64312F	(SMALL ICBM)	548,838	548,838	548,838		548,838
53	64361F	AIR LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE (ALCM)					
54	64410F	SPACE-BASED RADAR (SBR) FSD					
55	64711F	SYSTEMS SURVIVABILITY (NUCLEAR EFFECTS)	6,745	6,745	6,745		6,745
56	11113F	B-52 SQUADRONS	3,981	3,981	3,981		3,981
57	11120F	ADVANCED CRUISE MISSILE	108,698	108,698	108,698		108,698
58	11142F	KC-135 SQUADRONS	14,968	14,968	14,968		14,968
59	11213F	MINUTEMAN SQUADRONS	53,959	53,959	53,959		53,959
60	11312F	PACCS & WWABNCP SYS EC-135 CLASS V	1,314	1,314	1,314		1,314
61	11313F	WAR PLNG AUTO DATA PROCESSING	5,976	5,976	5,976		5,976
62	11815F	ADVANCED STRATEGIC PROGRAMS	[ ]				[ ]
63	12310F	NCMC - TW/AA SYSTEMS	133,000	133,000	133,000		133,000
64	12325F	JOINT SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM	5,390	5,390	5,390		5,390
65	12411F	SURVEILLANCE RADAR STATIONS/SITES	13,019	13,019	13,019		13,019
66	12412F	DEW RADAR STAT	2,862	2,862	2,862		2,862
67	12417F	Over-the-Horizon BACKSCATTER RADAR	7,961	7,961	7,961		7,961
68	12423F	BMEWS	17,887	17,887	17,887		17,887
69	12424F	SPACETRACK	20,124	20,124	20,124		20,124
70	1243F	DEFENSE SUPPORT PROGRAM	53,423	53,423	53,423		53,423
70a		FOLLOW-ON EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS	82,000	82,000	62,000		82,000
70b		ADVANCED WARNING SYSTEM					

71	12432F	SLBM RADAR WARNING SYSTEM	966	966	966		966
72	12433F	NUDET DETECTION SYSTEM	6,873	6,873	6,873		6,873
73	32015F	NATIONAL EMERGENCY AIRBORNE COMMAND POST					
74	33131F	MEECN	20,577	20,577	20,577		20,577
75	33152F	WWMCCS, INFORMATION SYSTEM	816	816	816		816
76	33601F	MILSTAR SAT COMM SYS(AF TERMINALS)	161,183	161,183	161,183		161,183
77	33603F	MILSTAR SAT COMM SYSTEM	90,263	90,263	90,263		90,263
78	35124F	SPECIAL APPLICATIONS PROGRAM	[ ]				[ ]
79	35892F	SPECIAL ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES	[ ]				[ ]
80	41123F	MILITARY AIRLIFT GROUP (IF)					
996		STRATEGIC CLASSIFIED	360,715	360,715	370,715		360,715
81	63107F	TECHNICAL EVALUATION SYSTEM	[ ]				[ ]
82	63230F	ADVANCED TACTICAL FIGHTER					
83	63260F	INTELLIGENCE ADVANCED DEV	5,497	5,497	5,497		5,497
84	63307F	AIR BASE OPERABILITY ADV DEV	3,375	3,375	3,375		3,375
85	63320F	LOW COST ANTI-RADIATION SEEKER					
86	63617F	COMMAND,CONTROL,& COMM APPLIC	3,399	3,399		3,399	3,399
87	63714f	DOD PHYSICAL SEC EQUIP-EXTERIOR	741	741	741		741
88	63742F	COMBAT IDENTIFICATION TECHNOLOGY	23,896	23,896	23,896		23,896
89	63801F	SPECIAL PROGRAMS	[ ]				[ ]
90	64201F	AIRCRAFT AVIONICS EQUIP DEV	14,909	14,909	14,909		14,909
91	64212F	AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT DEVELOPMENT	4,093	4,093	4,093		4,093
92	64218F	EMDP	1,022	1,022	1,022		1,022
92a		F-117A IMPROVEMENT		223,000		83,000	83,000
93	64222F	NUCLEAR WEAPONS SUPPORT	5,841	5,841	5,841		5,841
94	64223F	ALTERNATE FIGHTER ENGINE					
95	64231F	C-17 PROGRAM	377,359	377,359	377,359		377,359
96	64233F	SPECIALIZED UNDERGRA PILOT TRNG	4,274	4,274	4,274		4,274
97	64236F	INFRARED SEARCH AND TRACK SYSTEM					
98	64237F	VARIABLE STABILITY IN-FLT SIMULATOR	2,090	2,090	2,090		2,090
99	64239F	ADVANCED TACTICAL FIGHTER FSD	1,637,182	1,637,182	1,637,182		1,637,182
100	64242F	ADVANCED TACTICAL AIRCRAFT					
101	64245F	SHORT RNG ATTACK MISSILE-TACTICAL	34,346		34,346	-34,346	
102	64247F	MODULAR AUTOMATIC TEST EQUIPMENT					
103	64249F	NIGHT/PRECISION ATTACK	26,639	26,639	26,639		26,639
104	64250F	INTEGRATED EW/CNI DEVELOPMENT					
105	64268F	AIRCRAFT ENG COMP IMPROV PROG	114,101	114,101	114,101		114,101
106	64270F	EW DEVELOPMENT	215,221	211,221	215,221	-17,250	197,971
106a		B-1B RWR			-9,800	-9,800	-9,800
107	64321F	JOINT TACTICAL FUSION PROGRAM	[ ]				[ ]
108	64327F	HARDENED TARGET MUNITIONS	7,183	7,183	7,183		7,183
109	64601F	CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE EQUIP	12,741	12,741	12,741		12,741
110	64602F	ARMAMENT/ORDNANCE DEVELOPMENT	4,812	4,812	4,812		4,812
111	64604F	SUBMUNITIONS	5,082	5,082	5,082		5,082
112	64607F	WIDE-AREA, ANTI-ARMOR MUNITIONS					

113	64617F	AIR BASE OPERABILITY	10,170	10,170	10,170		10,170
114	64703F	AEROMEDICAL SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT	6,797	6,797	6,797		6,797
115	64704F	COMMON SUPPORT EQUIP DEV	12,675	12,675	15,175		12,675
116	64706F	LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS	12,253	12,253	12,253		12,253
117	64708F	CIVIL,FIRE,ENVIRON, SHELTER ENG	2,661	2,661	2,661		2,661
118	64725F	COMBAT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS					
119	64733F	SURFACE DEFENSE SUPPRESSION	21,464	21,464	21,464		21,464
120	64740F	COMPUTER RESOURCES MNGT TECH	8,419	8,419	8,419		8,419
121	64750F	INTELLIGENCE EQUIPMENT	2,983	2,983	2,983		2,983
122	64754F	JTIDS	16,421	16,421	16,421		16,421
123	64756F	SIDE LOOKING AIRBORNE RADAR	4,166	4,166			4,166
124	64770F	JOINT SURV/TARGET ATTACK RADAR	311,859	311,859	325,859	5,000	316,859
125	64779F	JOINT INTEROP OF TACT C2 SYS	5,622	5,622	5,622		5,622
126	27129F	F-111 SQUADRONS	30,067	30,067		30,067	30,067
127	27130F	F-15A/B/C/D SQUADRONS					
128	27131F	A-10 SQUADRONS	12,832	12,832	12,832		12,832
129	27133F	F-16 SQUADRONS	174,828	174,828	174,828	-14,850	159,978
130	27134F	F-15E SQUADRONS	119,795	119,795	119,795		119,795
131	27136F	MANNED DESTRUCTIVE SUPPRESSION	5,000	5,000	5,000		5,000
132	27137F	CONSTANT HELP	[ ]				[ ]
133	27141F	F-117A SQUADRONS	22,762	22,762	22,762		22,762
133a		F-117 RECCE MODS			15,000		
134	27161F	TACTICAL AIM MISSILES	26,358	26,358	26,358	-12,800	13,558
135	27162F	TACTICAL AGM MISSILES					
136	27163F	ADVND MED RNG AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE	30,582	30,582	10,582		30,582
137	27168F	F-111 SELF PROTECTION SYSTEMS					
138	27169F	SEEK CLOCK	[ ]				[ ]
139	27215F	TR-1 SQUADRON	54,220	54,220	20	-54,220	
140	27217F	FOLLOW-ON TAC RECON SYS	56,553	173,953	96,153	32,000	88,553
141	27247F	AF TEMCAP	562	562	562		562
142	27248F	SPECIAL TAC UNIT DETACHMENTS	[ ]				[ ]
143	27316F	TACIT RAINBOW					
144	27411F	OVERSEAS AIR WEAPON CON SYS	2,156	2,156	2,156		2,156
145	27412F	TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYS	23,564	23,564	23,564		23,564
146	27417F	AIRBORNE WARNING & CONTROL SYS	202,129	202,129	202,129		202,129
147	27419F	TACTICAL AIRBORNE COMM & CON SYS	3,483	3,483	3,483		3,483
148	27423F	ADVANCED COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS	3,980	3,980	3,980		3,980
148	27424F	COPPER COAST	[ ]				[ ]
150	27431F	TACTICAL AIR INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM ACTIV					
151	27433F	TACTICAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM	[ ]				[ ]
152	27579F	ADVANCED SYSTEM IMPROVEMENTS	[ ]				[ ]
153	27582F	HAVE TRUMP (H)	[ ]				[ ]
154	27590F	SEEK EAGLE	29,010	29,010	29,010	-8,000	21,010
155	27591F	OMEGA	[ ]				[ ]
156	28006F	MISSION PLANNING SYSTEMS	13,433	13,433	13,433		13,433
157	28010F	JOINT TACT COMMUNIC PRO (TRI-TAC)	6,709	6,709	6,709		6,709

and Executive Orders

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es, and (2) classified presi-  
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Chapter 32—National Defense

They shall release this information unless withholding is otherwise au-  
thorized under applicable law.

(d) Agency heads shall develop procedures to process requests for  
the mandatory review of classified information. These procedures shall  
apply to information classified under this or predecessor orders. They  
shall also provide a means for administratively appealing a denial of a  
mandatory review request.

(e) The Secretary of Defense shall develop special procedures for the  
review of cryptologic information, and the Director of Central Intelli-  
gence shall develop special procedures for the review of information  
pertaining to intelligence activities (including special activities), or intel-  
ligence sources or methods, after consultation with affected agencies.  
The Archivist shall develop special procedures for the review of infor-  
mation accessioned into the National Archives of the United States.

(f) In response to a request for information under the Freedom of In-  
formation Act, the Privacy Act of 1974, or the mandatory review pro-  
visions of this Order:

(1) An agency shall refuse to confirm or deny the existence or non-  
existence of requested information whenever the fact of its existence or  
non-existence is itself classifiable under this Order.

(2) When an agency receives any request for documents in its custo-  
dy that were classified by another agency, it shall refer copies of the  
request and the requested documents to the originating agency for  
processing, and may, after consultation with the originating agency,  
inform the requester of the referral. In cases in which the originating  
agency determines in writing that a response under Section 3.4(f)(1) is  
required, the referring agency shall respond to the requester in accord-  
ance with that Section.

PART 4

*Safeguarding*

SEC. 4.1 *General Restrictions on Access.*

(a) A person is eligible for access to classified information provided  
that a determination of trustworthiness has been made by agency heads  
or designated officials and provided that such access is essential to the  
accomplishment of lawful and authorized Government purposes.

(b) Controls shall be established by each agency to ensure that classi-  
fied information is used, processed, stored, reproduced, transmitted, and  
destroyed only under conditions that will provide adequate protection  
and prevent access by unauthorized persons.

(c) Classified information shall not be disseminated outside the execu-  
tive branch except under conditions that ensure that the information  
will be given protection equivalent to that afforded within the execu-  
tive branch.

(d) Except as provided by directives issued by the President through  
the National Security Council, classified information originating in one  
agency may not be disseminated outside any other agency to which it  
has been made available without the consent of the originating agency.  
For purposes of this Section, the Department of Defense shall be con-  
sidered one agency.

SEC. 4.2 *Special Access Programs.*

## Codification of Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders

(a) Agency heads designated pursuant to Section 1.2(a) may create special access programs to control access, distribution, and protection of particularly sensitive information classified pursuant to this Order or predecessor orders. Such programs may be created or continued only at the written direction of these agency heads. For special access programs pertaining to intelligence activities (including special activities but not including military operational, strategic and tactical programs), or intelligence sources or methods, this function will be exercised by the Director of Central Intelligence.

(b) Each agency head shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for special access programs. The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, consistent with the provisions of Section 5.2(b)(4), shall have non-delegable access to all such accountings.

*SEC. 4.3 Access by Historical Researchers and Former Presidential Appointees.*

(a) The requirement in Section 4.1(a) that access to classified information may be granted only as is essential to the accomplishment of authorized and lawful Government purposes may be waived as provided in Section 4.3(b) for persons who:

- (1) are engaged in historical research projects, or
- (2) previously have occupied policy-making positions to which they were appointed by the President.

(b) Waivers under Section 4.3(a) may be granted only if the originating agency:

- (1) determines in writing that access is consistent with the interest of national security;
- (2) takes appropriate steps to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure or compromise, and ensures that the information is safeguarded in a manner consistent with this Order; and
- (3) limits the access granted to former presidential appointees to items that the person originated, reviewed, signed, or received while serving as a presidential appointee.

## PART 5

### *Implementation and Review*

#### *SEC. 5.1 Policy Direction.*

(a) The National Security Council shall provide overall policy direction for the information security program.

(b) The Administrator of General Services shall be responsible for implementing and monitoring the program established pursuant to this Order. The Administrator shall delegate the implementation and monitoring functions of this program to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office.

#### *SEC. 5.2 Information Security Oversight Office.*

(a) The Information Security Oversight Office shall have a full-time Director appointed by the Administrator of General Services subject to approval by the President. The Director shall have the authority to appoint a staff for the Office.

(b) The Director shall:

(1) develop, in subject to the approval of the President, an implementation plan;

(2) oversee agency implementation of the plan;

(3) review all agency actions for systematic development, regulation or guidance, or implementation of the Order or implementation of the Order may be appealed to the President or the Information Security Oversight Office; and

(4) have the authority to suspend or terminate a security program or activity if the information or other cooperation is not consistent with the national security interests. If these interests are affected, the agency shall report to the President and the Information Security Oversight Office pending a prompt review;

(5) review requests for access to information by officials not granted access if appropriate, records, or information;

(6) consider any personnel within or outside of the information security program;

(7) have the authority to require agencies, standards, and information security programs;

(8) report at least annually to the President and the Information Security Oversight Office on

(9) have the authority to discuss matters pertaining to the program.

#### *SEC. 5.3 General*

Agencies that control information security and security education shall implement this Order;

(b) promulgate regulations that establish procedures for the affected members of the program;

(c) establish procedures for the need for access to information, including administrative clearance for persons granted access;

<sup>1</sup> EDITORIAL NOTE:

## Chapter 32—National Defense

### d Executive Orders

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(1) develop, in consultation with the agencies, and promulgate, subject to the approval of the National Security Council, directives for the implementation of this Order, which shall be binding on the agencies;

(2) oversee agency actions to ensure compliance with this Order and implementing directives;

(3) review all agency implementing regulations and agency guidelines for systematic declassification review. The Director shall require any regulation or guideline to be changed if it is not consistent with this Order or implementing directives. Any such decision by the Director may be appealed to the National Security Council. The agency regulation or guideline shall remain in effect pending a prompt decision on the appeal;

(4) have the authority to conduct on-site reviews of the information security program of each agency that generates or handles classified information and to require of each agency those reports, information, and other cooperation that may be necessary to fulfill the Director's responsibilities. If these reports, inspections, or access to specific categories of classified information would pose an exceptional national security risk, the affected agency head or the senior official designated under Section 5.3(a)(1)<sup>1</sup> may deny access. The Director may appeal denials to the National Security Council. The denial of access shall remain in effect pending a prompt decision on the appeal;

(5) review requests for original classification authority from agencies or officials not granted original classification authority and, if deemed appropriate, recommend presidential approval;

(6) consider and take action on complaints and suggestions from persons within or outside the Government with respect to the administration of the information security program;

(7) have the authority to prescribe, after consultation with affected agencies, standard forms that will promote the implementation of the information security program;

(8) report at least annually to the President through the National Security Council on the implementation of this Order; and

(9) have the authority to convene and chair interagency meetings to discuss matters pertaining to the information security program.

#### SEC. 5.3 *General Responsibilities.*

Agencies that originate or handle classified information shall:

(a) designate a senior agency official to direct and administer its information security program, which shall include an active oversight and security education program to ensure effective implementation of this Order;

(b) promulgate implementing regulations. Any unclassified regulations that establish agency information security policy shall be published in the FEDERAL REGISTER to the extent that these regulations affect members of the public;

(c) establish procedures to prevent unnecessary access to classified information, including procedures that (i) require that a demonstrable need for access to classified information is established before initiating administrative clearance procedures, and (ii) ensure that the number of persons granted access to classified information is limited to the mini-

<sup>1</sup> EDITORIAL NOTE: The correct citation is Section 5.3(a).



Chapter 32—National Defense

id Executive Orders

requirements and needs; protection of classified hostile areas.

Oversight Office finds; directives may have; head of the agency or 3(a)(1) 1 so that correc-

es Government, and its; ect to appropriate sanc-; se to unauthorized per-; Order or predecessor

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ment or governments,; or any element thereof; at the information, the; d in confidence; or; tes pursuant to or as a; government or govern-

ments or an international organization of governments, or any element thereof, requiring that the information, the arrangement, or both, are to be held in confidence.

(e) "National security" means the national defense or foreign relations of the United States.

(f) "Confidential source" means any individual or organization that has provided, or that may reasonably be expected to provide, information to the United States on matters pertaining to the national security with the expectation, expressed or implied, that the information or relationship, or both, be held in confidence.

(g) "Original classification" means an initial determination that information requires, in the interest of national security, protection against unauthorized disclosure, together with a classification designation signifying the level of protection required.

SEC. 6.2 General.

(a) Nothing in this Order shall supersede any requirement made by or under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. "Restricted Data" and "Formerly Restricted Data" shall be handled, protected, classified, downgraded, and declassified in conformity with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and regulations issued under that Act.

(b) The Attorney General, upon request by the head of an agency or the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, shall render an interpretation of this Order with respect to any question arising in the course of its administration.

(c) Nothing in this Order limits the protection afforded any information by other provisions of law.

(d) Executive Order No. 12065 of June 28, 1978, as amended, is revoked as of the effective date of this Order.

(e) This Order shall become effective on August 1, 1982.

Executive Order 12537—President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

SOURCE: The provisions of Executive Order 12537 of Oct. 28, 1985, appear at 50 FR 45083, 3 CFR, 1985 Comp., p. 394, unless otherwise noted.

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and statutes of the United States of America, and in order to enhance the security of the United States by improving the quality and effectiveness of intelligence available to the United States, it is ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. There is hereby established within the White House Office, Executive Office of the President, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (the "Board"). The Board shall consist of not more than sixteen members, who shall serve at the pleasure of the President and shall be appointed by the President from among trustworthy and distinguished citizens outside the government who are qualified on the basis of achievement, experience, and independence. The President shall establish the terms of the members upon their appointment. To the extent practicable, one-third of the Board at any one time shall be comprised of members whose current term of service does not exceed two years. The President shall designate a Chairman and Vice Chairman from among the members. The Board shall utilize full-